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NOTES

WYOMING EXTRADITION
Extradiction is not a modern concept. Its history dates back as far
as records are available, in one form or another.1 In this country it had
its beginning in the colonies as a matter of comity. Later, when the
thirteen original states formed a union, it was provided for in the Articles
of Confederation. 2 The Fathers of our country in drafting our Constitution
realized the necessity of such a provision. Without substantially changing
the language used in the Articles of Confederation, they included the extradition clause in the United States Constitution. 3 In 1793, acting upon the
suggestion of Attorney General Randolph, Congress enacted legislation to
4
provide machinery for the execution of the federal extradition clause.
In 1926, the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
attempted to codify the more desirable features of the extradition
statutes in existence in the various states, in the form of the "Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act." The Commission made some minor amendments to the Act in 1932, and in 1936 announced a revision of the Act.
Extradition in Wyoming is based primarily upon Sections 10-2401 to
10-2427 of the Compiled Statutes of 1945, which is the original Uniform
Criminal Extradition Act of 1926, plus the amendments which the Commission made in 1932. We have not adopted the revised Act promulgated
in 1936. Our statutes are authority to the extent that they do not conflict
with the requirements of the United States Constitution and the federal
statutes on the subject, since the federal laws are paramount in this area.
Wyoming enacted its extradition statutes in their present form in 1935.
The Uniform Act as we have it at present may be summarized as follows:
In cases involving the extradition from Wyoming of a fugitive from the
justice of another state, it is the duty of the Governor to have such person
arrested and delivered up to the executive authority of the demanding
state upon certain conditions being met. To initiate the proceedings, the
Governor of the demanding state must present to the Governor of Wyoming
a requisition for the return of the fugitive. Upon receipt of such requisi1.
2.

3.

4.

14 Bost. U.L. Rev. 592-597 (1934).
Articles of Conferation, Art. IV, para. 2.
U.S. Const., Art. IV, Sec. 2, para. 2. "A person charged in any state with treason,
felony, or other crime, who shall flee from justice, and be found in another state,
shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which he fled, be
delivered up, to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime."
62 Stat. 821 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. 3182. "Whenever the executive authority of any
State or Territory demands any person as a fugitive from justice, of the executive
authority of any State, District or Territory, to which such person has fled, and
produces a copy of an indictment found or an affidavit made before a magistrate
of any State or Territory, charging the person demanded with having committed
treason, felony, or other crime, certified as authentic by the governor or chief
magistrate of the State or Territory from whence the person so charged has fled,
the executive authority of the State, District or Territory to which such person
has fled shall cause him to be arrested and secured, and notify the executive
authority making such demand, or the agent of such authority appointed to receive
the fugitive, and shall cause the fugitive to be delivered to such agent when he shall
appear. If no such agent appears within thirty days from the time of the arrest,
the prisoner may be discharged."
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tion, the Governor is required to make an investigation of the request.
He may call upon the Attorney-General to assist in the investigation. If
the Governor decides that the request is just, he then issues a warrant for
the arrest of the accused, directed to the proper authorities qualified to
make arrests. When the accused is arrested, he must be informed of the
request for his surrender, and be given an opportunity to retain counsel
if he so desires.
In the event that the alleged fugitive wishes to test the validity of
the extradition, he may do so by a writ of habeas corpus. Petition for the
writ must be filed in the county in which the arrest was made. Almost
without exception, the various questions which arise in connection with
extradition are settled by the courts through the medium of this habeas
corpus procedure. The problems which most frequently arise will be
discussed hereinafter. If the habeas corpus is denied, or if the arrest is not
contested, the fugitive will be turned over to an agent of the demanding
state.5
In the event Wyoming wants a fugitive from justice returned to this
state from another state, the prosecuting attorney of the county in which
the alleged felony, treason or other crime was committed initiates the
action by making a written application for a requisition for the return of
such person. The application states that a crime has been committed, and
names the State in which it is believed the accused can be found. The
application must be verified by affidavit, and be accompanied by certified
copies of the indictment, information or complaint made before a magistrate and prepared in duplicate. One set of the documents must be filed
with the Secretary of State of Wyoming, and in the event the Governor of
Wyoming deems the claim to be just, the other set is forwarded with the
Governor's requisition to the executive authority of the asylum state. At
the same time the Governor appoints an agent to whom the fugitive is to
be delivered.0
The majority of changes made by the Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws in 1936 were only minor. However, this revision added three important changes: first, provisions for the extradition of persons already
7
convicted of crimes who have escaped from custody or confinement;
second, provisions under which an accused can waive the extradition
process;s and third, a provision by which one state does not waive its right
to demand a fugitive from another state by not taking action as soon as
it gains information as to the fugitive's whereabouts. 9
In the interest of making Wyoming statutes more complete, it would
seem that the addition of provisions for the return of convicted criminals,
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Wyoming Compiled Statutes, §§ 10-2401 to 10-2427 (1945).
Ibid.
9 U.L.A. 221, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, Sec. 23, Subsec. II.
Id. 226, Sec. 25A
Id. 227, Sec. 25B.
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and the waiver provisions, are desirable. In the absence of these additions
to the Act suggested by the Commissioners in 1936, it would be entirely
speculative as to what a Wyoming court would do if confronted by those
particular problems.
The principal problems which have arisen in connection with extradition are the following: First, the constitutionality of state statutes.
It is well settled that interstate extradition is primarily a federal
matter. The Federal Constitution and effectuating statutes are supreme,
and any state legislation which may be contra is unconstitutional and
void. 10
An interesting application of this principle occurred in a recent
decision by the Supreme Court of Idaho" which held that the phrase,
"together with a copy of any warrant which was issued thereon," found in
Section 3 of the Revised Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 12 was'unconstitutional and void. This phrase was used in the state statute as a
required document to be forwarded to the Governor of the asylum state.
The question arose when the petitioner for a writ of habeas corpus alleged
that in the absence of a warrant, the arrest did not comply with the statute.
The Idaho court concluded that since the federal statutes regarding extradition did not require such a warrant, a state could not make an additional
requirement mandatory. The court in reaching its decision followed an
4
Arizona case.' 3 The identical phrase is found in the Wyoming statutes.'
The controlling character of the federal statute is further exemplified
by the 30 day provision within which time the agent appointed by the
Governor of the demanding state must appear and accept delivery of the
accused. If the agent does not appear in that period the accused must
be released.' 5 This time limit applies to all states, whether or not they
have such provisions. Wyoming does not have such a provision. The
majority of states having a time limit follow the 30 day provision of the
federal statute.' 6
In a New York case the petitioner questioned the right of a state to
extradite on the basis of an information. The federal statute provides
for an "indictment or affidavit" made before a magistrate. The court
held that a literal compliance was not necessary, and that a state was not
prohibited from extraditing on less exacting terms than prescribed by the
7
federal statute."
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.

People ex rel. Carr v. Murray, 357 I11. 326, 192 N.E. 198, 94 A.L.R. 1487 (1934);
Ex parte Riccardi, 68 Ariz. 180, 203 P.2d 627 (1949) ; People ex rel. Millet v. Babb,
1 Ill.2d 191, 115 N.E.2d 241 (1953).
Application of Williams, 76 Idaho 173, 279 P.2d 882 (1955).
9 U.L.A. 180.
Ex parte Riccardi, 68 Ariz. 180, 203 P.2d 627 (1949).
Wyoming Compiled Statutes § 10-2403 (1945).
-..108 A.2d 24 (1954).
Foley v. State,........ N.J ---62 Stat. 821 (1948), 18 U.S.C.A. 3182.
People ex rel. Hollander v. Britt, 195 Misc. 722, 92 N.Y.S.2d 666, Affirmed 4th Dept.
272 App. Div. 815, 93 N.Y.S.2d 704.
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One of the main contentions urged by persons who resist extradition
has to do with the requirement that they be fugitives from justice. The
question of who is a "fugitive from justice" is reasonably well settled.
The cases seem to indicate that a person is a fugitive from the justice of
another state when he is charged with a crime in one state and is subsequently found in another state's jurisdiction, regardless of his reasons
for leaving the state in which the crime was committed. In the case of
Pearson v. Campbell 8 the accused contended that he was not a fugitive
because he was in the military service and left the demanding state under
orders. However, the New Hampshire court disregarded the excuse and
held that the accused was a fugitive from justice.
The courts of the asylum state will not pass judgment upon the guilt
or innocence of the accused. In the Alabama case of Kilgore v. State 9
as a matter of dictum the court stated: "The guilt or innocence of the
accuesd in an extradition proceeding is not presented and may not be
inquired into except as it may be material in identifying the person
charged and that he was or was not a fugitive from justice." The fugitive
status of the accused is not changed by the fact that he considers himself
20
to be innocent.
The requirement that the alleged criminal must be present in the
demanding state at the time the crime was committed is fulfilled if, having
been there, he commits some overt act in furtherance of a crime subsequently consummated after he has departed the state.21 Thus physical
presence at the time of the crime is not necessary in all cases to comply
with the extradition statutes. This requirement of presence in the demanding state at the time the crime was committed is found in the Revised
Act and Section 10-2405 of the Wyoming Compiled Statutes of 1945.
A real exception to the rule that one sought to be extradited must
have been in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the
crime and must have fled therefrom, sometimes occurs in connection with
the crime of non-support. In the case of Harrisonv. State,22 the petitioner
contended he was at all times a resident of the asylum state, and that he
was not in the demanding state at the time of the commission of the crime
and did not subsequently leave that state. The court reasoned that the
Uniform Enforcement of Support Act specifically provided for non-support
18.
19.
20.
21.

22.

Pearson v. Campbell, 97 N.H. '444, 91 A.2d 453 (1952); see also Application of
Gorgen, 160' Neb. 457, 70 N.W.2d 514 (1955); Appleyard v. Massachusetts, 203 U.S.
222, 27 S.Ct. 122, 51 L.Ed. 161, 7 Ann.Cas. 1073 (1906).
Kilgore v. State, 126 Ala. 465, 75 So.2d 126, 127 (1954).
Tobin v. Casaus, 128 Cal.App.2d 588, 275 P.2d 792 (1954); In re Thurber, 37 Cal.
App. 571, 174 Pac. 112 (1918).
Chapman v. Hayward, 160 Neb. 664, 71 N.W.2d 201 (1955). Facts of this case are
as follows: Chapman obtained an order releasing him from Utah State Prison. He
left Utah before a final order of his release was filed. The crime charged was the
securing of an illegal release. His overt act was the putting in force the agency
to secure what resulted in an illegal release.
Application of Campbell, 147 Neb. 820, 25 N.W.2d 419 (1946).
77 So.2d 384 (1954).
Harrison v. State-Ala...
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as an extradictable crime. Thus an obligor could be extradited regardless
of the fact that he was not in the demanding state at the time the crime was
committed.
Under the Support Act the obligor may be relieved of extradition by
submitting to the jurisdiction of the responding state and making the
necessary support payments. However, a California court would not
permit the obligor to submit voluntarily to its jurisdiction. 23 The opinion
reasoned that the option of extradition or of allowing the obligor to submit
to the jurisdiction of the asylum state was vested in the obligee or the
demanding state. The majority felt that it was difficult for a responding
state to determine adequately the needs of the obligee. However, it depends on the statute of the demanding state as to whether an obligor can
institute proceedings. The Ohio statute involved in this case gave two
courses of action which could be taken, first, that of extradition and
second, that the obligor could submit to the jurisdiction of the responding
state. The dissent in the same case took a somewhat more equitable
view. The minority felt that the obligor, as long he was making payments,
should be relieved of extradition. They thought the obligor should be
left where he was making his money so the support money could be paid.
Further the dissenters said the action of the majority would lend itself
more to the satisfaction of vengeance than to the purpose of the Uniform
Act.
This problem has significance for Wyoming in view of Wyoming's
adoption of the Uniform Enforcement of Support Act in 1953.24
Another major attack of the petitioner in a habeas corpus proceeding
involves contesting the validity of the extradition papers.
The governor's rendition warrant establishes a prima facie case as
to the necessary jurisdictional facts and raises a presumption that the
person named therein is a fugitive from justice. This presumption, however, is rebuttable by the accused. It has been said that the evidence
to overcome this presumption must be overwhelmingly in favor of the
accused, and that a mere conflict in the evidence is not sufficient. 25
The alleged fugitive has a right to inspect the requisition and accompanying papers. Such inspection must be made at a reasonable time and
before the habeas corpus trial. Failure of the authorities to allow the inspection will rebut the prima facie case established against the petitioner
26
by the governor's warrant.
The affidavits required by the statutes in support of an information
or indictment are for the benefit of the governors of the demanding and
23.
24.
25.
26.

Ex parte Floyd, 43 Cal.2d 379, 273 P.2d 820 (1954).
Wyoming Compiled Statutes §§ 3-8101 to 3-8129 (1945).
Mason v. Warden, Baltimore City Jail,........ Md- -------99 A.2d 739 (1955); Munsey
v. Clough, 196 U.S. 364, 25 S.Ct. 282, 49 L.Ed. 515 (1905).
Johnson v. State, 261 Ala. 1, 72 So.2d 863 (1954); Denson v. State, 257 Ala. 184, 57
So.2d 830 (1951).
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asylum states. They indicate that the information is not unfounded.
They should be dated within a reasonable time of the information, although
otherwise their date is not significant. A New York court held that
affidavits dated six months after the information were sufficient to show
it was based on actual knowledge. 27 An affidavit from the head of the
prison department of the demanding state, along with other properly
authenticated papers, will definitely establish the status of an accused as
being a fugitive from justice, thus showing that the accused had been
28
convicted of a crime and had escaped from confinement.
In an Oklahoma case the court pointed out that any question of motive
or good faith of the prosecution should be raised at a hearing before the
governor prior to the issuance of the rendition warrant. 29 However, as a
general rue the motive underlying the institution of the proceeding
.cannot be inquired into by the courts of the asylum state, since such an
inquiry would be in the nature of an attempt by one state to construe the
criminal laws of a sister state. It is within the sole discretion of the
demanding state as to what constitutes a substantial charge of crime in
that state.8 0 It is only necessary that it should appear to the governor of
8
the responding state that a crime is substantially charged in the papers. 1
The indictment is sufficient if it substantially charges that a crime has
been committed. The prosecution in a criminal trial is not bound to
show the exact time the crime was committed. Thus the indictment need
only show that the accused was in the demanding state in the neighborhood
32
of the time alleged.
After a fugitive has been extradited it is possible to try him on any
criminal charge which the demanding state may have against him. Even
though the crime for which he is put on trial differs from the one under
which he was extradited, it is not necessary to allow him to leave the
33
state and start the proceeding over again before prosecution.
A different situation results when the additional or unrelated charge
is a civil proceeding. Under the Wyoming statute the fugitive must be
released and allowed to return to the state from which he was extradited
34
before service of process can be made upon him.

31.

People ex rel. Moore v. Skinner, 284 App.Div. 770, 135 N.Y.S.2d 107 (1954).
Smith v. Nye, 176 Kan. 679, 272 P.2d 1079 (1954).
Ex parte Beam, 96 Okla.Cr. 227, 252, P.2d 179 (1952).
People ex rel. Carr v. Murry, 357 Ill. 326, 192 N.E. 198, 94 A.L.R. 1487 (1934);
Fortier v. Frink, 92 N.H. 50, 24 A.2d 605 (1942); Justice v. Lockett, 175 Kan. 25,
259 P.2d 152 (1953) ; Ex parte Cohen -....... N.J.-__ 92 A.2d 837 (1952).
People v. Jeremiah, 364 111. 274, 4 N.E.2d 373 (1936).

32.

Ex parte Crowley, 268 F. 1016 (D.C.D. Mass. 1920).

27.
28.
29.
30.

33.
34.

People v. Martin, 188 Cal. 281, 205 Pac. 121, -21 A.L.R. 1399 (1922).
"A person brought into this
Wyoming Compiled Statutes § 10-2425 (1945).
State on extradition based on a criminal charge, shall not be subject to service of
personal process in civil actions arising out of the same facts as the criminal proceedings to answer which he is returned, until he has been convicted in the criminal
proceedings, or if acquitted, until he has had ample opportunity to return to the
State from which he was extradited."
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There have been only a few cases decided by the Supreme Court of
Wyoming involving extradition, but all were decided prior to the enactment of the Uniform Act and have significance in determining who is a
fugitive from justice.38
An analysis of the cases decided elsewhere does not reveal any particular
trend. No movement away from the older cases could be expected, since
the Uniform Act is for the most part merely a codification of the already
existing law.
Wyoming has a compact with Kansas, New Mexico and Colorado for
the arrest of fugitives which makes extradition proceedings unnecessary. 6
Law enforcement officers from those states are permitted by the compact
to come into Wyoming, make arrests of fugitives, and remove them from
Wyoming without action on the part of Wyoming courts or officers.
Wyoming officers have the same permission to make arrests in the other
three states which are members of the compact. To the extent of the
compact we are by-passing the extradition statutes.
The Wyoming legislature should adopt the changes recommended by
the Commissioners on Uniform Laws, and the problem of interstate rendition of fugitives can be made progressively simpler through the adoption of
additional agreements with sister states permitting law enforcement officers
to make arrests within the boundaries of the states making such agreements.
EARL L. WILLAMS,

JR.

A POSSIBLE BAR TO IMPLIED COVENANTS IN WYOMING
OIL AND GAS LEASES
Wyoming's progress in oil and gas production has made the rights and
duties of the parties to an oil and gas lease of particular significance to
attorneys practicing throughout the state. A particularly important phase
of the law of oil and gas is the doctrine of implied covenants. Since the
courts have talked of implied covenants in connection with ordinary leases,
there has been a tendency to apply the same term to the obligation inferred
in the oil and gas lease. By reason of the common lack of stipulations in
oil and gas leases governing exploration, development, and operation, the
courts have sought to decide these questions by the doctrine of implied
covenants. The Wyoming Supreme Court and the Federal District Court
of Wyoming indicate they recognize such covenants, yet one finds an
apparent conflict with such a result upon examination of the Wyoming
statutes.
A Wyoming statute provides that no covenants will be implied in any
35.
36.

Ryan v. Rogers, 21 Wyo. 311, 132 Pac. 95 (1913); Zulch v. Roach, 23 Wyo. 335, 151
Pac. 1101 (1915); Harris v. State, 23 Wyo. 487, 153 Pac. 881 (1916).
Wyoming Compiled Statutes §§ 10-2701 to 10-2704 (1945).

